It should come as no surprise that Iran wants to shunt France out of a deal to enrich its nuclear fuel abroad. Dividing its enemies and isolating the more hawkish among them has been a hallmark of Tehran’s diplomacy, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy routinely plays the tough cop with Iran, threatening and goading its leaders and urging U.S. President Barack Obama to take a tougher line. On Tuesday, Iran struck back with a humiliating slap-down, insisting that France butt out of the deal because Tehran could not trust the nation to honor its commitments. Iranian diplomats even delayed the start of the day’s talks in Vienna on the agreement, insisting that it was unnecessary for the French to be in the room. Eventually the talks went ahead with French delegates present, but Iranian officials insisted that they would not accept France as a supplier. The New York Times reported that a face-saving compromise was being developed that would see Iran make a deal with Russia, which could separately subcontract work out to France.
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“We do not need a lot of fuel, and we do not need the presence of many countries,” Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, stressing Tehran’s desire to work on the deal with the U.S. and Russia. “There is no need for France to be present,” he said, adding that Iran believes that France “is not a trustworthy party to provide fuel for Iran.”
Snubbing France while offering an agreement with the U.S. and Russia is vintage Iranian divide-and-conquer diplomacy — although this time there may be incentives for all sides to play the game. The Vienna talks are on the details of an agreement, announced at the Geneva talks on Oct. 1, under which Iran would ship much of its enriched-uranium stockpile abroad for reprocessing to fuel a medical research reactor in Tehran. Together with Iran’s agreement to submit its hitherto secret enrichment site at Qum to inspection, the deal offered an important opportunity to strengthen safeguards against Iran’s turning its growing stockpile of low-enriched uranium into bomb material. Iran also liked the deal, seeing it as tacit recognition of uranium-enrichment in Iran as an intractable fact — Tehran reiterated on Tuesday that it has no intention of halting uranium enrichment, as Western powers continue to demand, in line with U.N. Security Council resolutions.
The Vienna move may be read as Iran flexing its muscle with respect to a deal that the Obama Administration badly needs — international support for harsher sanctions remains limited as long as Iran is ready to offer some form of cooperation. But in doing so while isolating the most hard-line among the Western powers, Tehran may be offering concessions that it’s willing to give, while enjoying a personal poke at Sarkozy.
Since his election in May 2007, the French President has taken positions on Iran worthy of the most hawkish members of the Bush Administration. In July 2007, he warned that the world would have to force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program, or face a “catastrophic alternative: the Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran.” And that was just his warm-up.
Last month, while attending the U.N. General Assembly in New York City, Sarkozy appeared to mock Obama’s more temperate and generalized remarks on nuclear proliferation. Nostrils flaring, Sarkozy responded to the U.S. President’s remarks by calling Iran’s nuclear program the leading threat to international security, which three years of U.N. efforts had not diminished. “What are we going to do about it?” Sarkozy petulantly asked his American counterpart.
And in contrast to Obama’s cautious comments on Iran’s disputed election last June, Sarkozy took a lead in denouncing the regime, declaring that “the people of Iran deserve better than their current leaders.” Little wonder, then, that when the opportunity arose, Iranian officials moved to throw France off the diplomatic bus.
“Dramatically effective though it may seem at times, Sarkozy’s aggressive behavior — indeed, his very personality — ensures certain things will inevitably come back to bite him,” notes John Kent, professor in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. “He’s a bit like [former British Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher in the way he’ll stake out strong, antagonistic positions that over time undermine his credibility to calmly seek consensus solutions because the atmospheres he creates are more favorable to histrionics.”
Sarkozy’s trash-talking of Iran has in fact allowed Tehran to use him as a useful whipping boy, projecting toughness and defiance for a domestic audience, while at the same time keep lines of dialogue open with the U.S. And Tuesday’s diplomatic slap was more symbolic than substantial. After all, France remains a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, which gives it a seat at the main nuclear talks with Iran. (Those talks began in Geneva on Oct. 1; the Vienna session was a technical meeting on the terms of a processing deal.) Iran isn’t refusing to negotiate with France in the room but simply declining to accept it as a supplier of processed uranium.
“Despite the [Iranian] demands, our experts continue to participate in talks as they always have,” a French diplomat told TIME on Tuesday. “Tomorrow may be another story — or it might not. Who can tell with Iran?”
The Vienna talks ended inconclusively, and a further session is reportedly scheduled. But they served as a reminder that the search for a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear standoff will be protracted and perilous, and their outcome will probably be less than what the Western powers had hoped for. Even then, it may be the only game in town.
President Obama’s New Missile Defense Plan Does Not Address U.S. Homeland Population Protection
WASHINGTON, Sept. 23 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ — Riki Ellison, Chairman and President of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) www.missiledefenseadvocacyalliance.org has developed a White Paper that analyzes the recent missile defense decision by President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The White Paper states that the protection of our homeland population is a risk we are facing with the new missile defense plan. Ellison has shared the White Paper with members of Congress, and it is detailed below:
Background
On September 17, 2009, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates unveiled a shift in missile defense policy abandoning the “Third Site” in Europe, outlining a “new missile defense architecture” for the protection of Europe primarily focusing on the development, evolution and deployment of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), which will be both sea- and land-based. These will protect our forward deployed troops, friends and allies in Europe from the Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat. The “new missile defense architecture” does not address or replace the protection from Iranian long-range ballistic missiles that the “Third Site” in Europe would have provided.
Findings
This “new missile defense architecture” is a step forward and will better protect our forward deployed troops, friends and allies. It is a positive move towards a future global missile defense system that is adaptable, integrated, interoperable and will offer cost-sharing opportunities with our allies.
The “new missile defense architecture” does not address or replace the protection of the U.S. Homeland from Iranian long-range ballistic missiles that the “Third Site” in Europe addressed until 2020 with a nonexistent, untested and unproven version of the SM-3.
The “Third site” in Europe was positioned for long-range ballistic protection for the U.S. Homeland and two early warning missile defense radars in Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales, England as the current and future deployed Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska and California are dependent on these two fixed radars sites to protect the U.S. Homeland from long-range missiles from Iran.
Due to the geographic distances from Alaska to the Southeastern and Eastern regions of the U.S. Homeland, a long-range ballistic missile attack from Iran would not yield the same protection and multiple-shot doctrine (Look-Shoot-Look) as the rest of the country now has with the current missile defense system, thus increasing the risk of success and lowering the confidence of the systems capability to defend the Eastern and Southeastern regions of our country.
The proliferation of short- and medium-range missiles from Iran is the main driver for this “new missile defense architecture.” The placement of short- and medium-range Iranian missiles on sea-based platforms against the U.S. Homeland needs to be equally addressed as Iran has demonstrated this capability.
Iran’s successful launch of the Safir space launch vehicle that placed a satellite in orbit on February 2, 2009 and the Iranian 1,200 mile solid fueled two stage missile launched on May 20, 2009 coupled with their continued proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic missile tests demonstrates their technical proficiency in developing an ICBM. It is of note that the former U.S.S.R. took six months from its first successful satellite launch in 1958 to develop an ICBM that could reach the U.S. Homeland.
As of yet, there has not been a credible solution or realistic alternative offered by the President or the Department of Defense to replace the protection of the U.S. Homeland and the radars in Greenland and England that the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic would have done, nor has there been a “hedge” solution introduced against sea-based short- and medium-range missiles threats against the U.S. Homeland in the announced “new missile defense architecture.”
Analysis
The White House announced that it is reshaping American missile defense policy with a stronger emphasis toward the short- and medium-range missile threat from Iran. This change entails abandoning plans to build ten Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland and a long-range radar system in the Czech Republic. Instead, President Obama proposed implementing a multi-phased plan to create a “new missile defense architecture.” The first phase consists of deploying SM-3 Block 1A missiles, launched from Aegis ships, to Europe while pursing options for land-based deployment of the same system, “Aegis Ashore.” Under the final phase of the plan, the White House anticipates the deployment of SM-3 Block 2B to Europe by 2020 to have the capability to intercept long-range ballistic missiles — eleven years from now.
The previous plan to build GBIs in Europe aimed to protect our European allies, our troops deployed, and most importantly, our homeland. Because SM-3s are designed to intercept short- and medium-range missiles, the change from GBIs to SM-3s will provide insufficient coverage against long-range ballistic missile threats for our country and the two fixed radars in Greenland and England for the next eleven years. The new proposal covers the second and third priorities of our missile defense doctrine as outlined by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, protecting our allies and our troops, but it does not fulfill the first and most important priority, outlined in the plan for missile defense: “the defense of our homeland.”
Under the plan, the SM-3 Block 2B missiles, the plan’s solution to long-range missile threats, are not slated to deploy until 2020 if the technology is proven. Eleven years without missile protection for the East Coast is too long to put “at risk” the American public. While MDAA supports the President’s vision for a “new missile defense architecture,” we must call attention to the inadequate protection that the East Coast and Southeast will receive under this plan and the lack of a missile defense “hedge” for sea-based short- and medium-range missile threats to our Homeland. The United States invested tens of billions of dollars over the last seven years to produce defense against long-range, medium-range and short-range missile threats. From this labor and the tens of billions of tax dollars spent, the U.S. has created a technically capable and deployed answer to ballistic missile threats, but still needs a policy solution from the Obama administration to provide equal protection for the U.S. Homeland.
Riki Ellison is available for on-the-record interviews about our nation’s missile defense program. Call 602 885-1955 to arrange.
Iran has displayed its first indigenously produced ballistic missiles in a publicized military parade outside the shrine of Imam Khomeini. The ballistic missile is the Sejil, and while not much is known about the missile it is believed it is a two stage solid fuel missile. It is also reported that they are being mass produced. The show opened Iran’s Week of Holy Defense which commemorates the sacrifices made by Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War.
The President’s decision to alter missile defense plans for Europe has sent shockwaves through the defense industry. To be sure, there are those companies that benefit from this decision and those that loose. The main loser is Boeing. After all, Boeing was the principal contractor for the Ground-Based Midcourse system of which the European site was a significant part. Another big loser was Orbital Sciences Corporation which was slated to provide the 10 interceptors for the European site.
But other defense contractors could prove to be big winners, especially Lockheed Martin and Raytheon which produced ship-based or mobile system. Raytheon makes the Aegis sea-based missile interceptors and Lockheed makes their control system.
Check out this New York Times Op-ed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on the Administration’s new plans for missile defense. It’s worth noting that Secretary Gates was the Secretary of Defense who signed off on the original plan to place Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland and sensors in the Czech Republic.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin released a statement on the President’s decision to scrap the current agreements to place Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland and radars in the Czech Republic. He said:
“I expect that after this correct and brave decision, others will follow, including the complete removal of all restrictions on the transfer of high technology to Russia and activity to widen the membership of the World Trade Organization to (include) Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus,”
Office of the Press Secretary
__________________________________________________________________________
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 17, 2009
Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy
A “Phased, Adaptive Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe
President Obama has approved the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. This approach is based on an assessment of the Iranian missile threat, and a commitment to deploy technology that is proven, cost-effective, and adaptable to an evolving security environment.
Starting around 2011, this missile defense architecture will feature deployments of increasingly-capable sea- and land-based missile interceptors, primarily upgraded versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and a range of sensors in Europe to defend against the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran. This phased approach develops the capability to augment our current protection of the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats, and to offer more effective defenses against more near-term ballistic missile threats. The plan provides for the defense of U.S. deployed forces, their families, and our Allies in Europe sooner and more comprehensively than the previous program, and involves more flexible and survivable systems.
The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President that he revise the previous Administration’s 2007 plan for missile defense in Europe as part of an ongoing comprehensive review of our missile defenses mandated by Congress. Two major developments led to this unanimous recommended change:
New Threat Assessment: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated. In the near-term, the greatest missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as well as to U.S. deployed personnel – military and civilian –and their accompanying families in the Middle East and in Europe.
Advances in Capabilities and Technologies: Over the past several years, U.S. missile defense capabilities and technologies have advanced significantly. We expect this trend to continue. Improved interceptor capabilities, such as advanced versions of the SM-3, offer a more flexible, capable, and cost-effective architecture. Improved sensor technologies offer a variety of options to detect and track enemy missiles.
These changes in the threat as well as our capabilities and technologies underscore the need for an adaptable architecture. This architecture is responsive to the current threat, but could also incorporate relevant technologies quickly and cost-effectively to respond to evolving threats. Accordingly, the Department of Defense has developed a four-phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. While further advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of later phases, current plans call for the following:
Phase One (in the 2011 timeframe) – Deploy current and proven missile defense systems available in the next two years, including the sea-based Aegis Weapon System, the SM-3 interceptor (Block IA), and sensors such as the forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2), to address regional ballistic missile threats to Europe and our deployed personnel and their families;
Phase Two (in the 2015 timeframe) – After appropriate testing, deploy a more capable version of the SM-3 interceptor (Block IB) in both sea- and land-based configurations, and more advanced sensors, to expand the defended area against short- and medium-range missile threats;
Phase Three (in the 2018 timeframe) – After development and testing are complete, deploy the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA variant currently under development, to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats; and
Phase Four (in the 2020 timeframe) – After development and testing are complete, deploy the SM-3 Block IIB to help better cope with medium- and intermediate-range missiles and the potential future ICBM threat to the United States.
Throughout all four phases, the United States also will be testing and updating a range of approaches for improving our sensors for missile defense. The new distributed interceptor and sensor architecture also does not require a single, large, fixed European radar that was to be located in the Czech Republic; this approach also uses different interceptor technology than the previous program, removing the need for a single field of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense recommended that the United States no longer plan to move forward with that architecture.
The Czech Republic and Poland, as close, strategic and steadfast Allies of the United States, will be central to our continued consultations with NATO Allies on our defense against the growing ballistic missile threat.
The phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe:
Sustains U.S. homeland defense against long-range ballistic missile threats. The deployment of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor in Phase Four of the approach would augment existing ground-based interceptors located in Alaska and California, which provide for the defense of the homeland against a potential ICBM threat.
Speeds protection of U.S. deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their accompanying familiesagainst the near-term missile threat from Iran. We would deploy current and proven technology by roughly 2011 – about six or seven years earlier than the previous plan – to help defend the regions in Europe most vulnerable to the Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat.
Ensures and enhances the protection of the territory and populations of all NATO Allies, in concert with their missile defense capabilities, against the current and growing ballistic missile threat. Starting in 2011, the phased, adaptive approach would systematically increase the defended area as the threat is expected to grow. In the 2018 timeframe, all of Europe could be protected by our collective missile defense architecture.
Deploys proven capabilities and technologies to meet current threats. SM-3 (Block 1A) interceptors are deployed on Aegis ships today, and more advanced versions are in various stages of development. Over the past four years, we have conducted a number of tests of the SM-3 IA, and it was the interceptor used in the successful engagement of a decaying satellite in February 2008. Testing in 2008 showed that sensors we plan to field bring significant capabilities to the architecture, and additional, planned research and development over the next few years offers the potential for more diverse and more capable sensors.
Provides flexibility to upgrade and adjust the architecture, and to do so in a cost-effective manner, as the threat evolves. Because of the lower per-interceptor costs and mobility of key elements of the architecture, we will be better postured to adapt this set of defenses to any changes in threat.
We will work with our Allies to integrate this architecture with NATO members’ missile defense capabilities, as well as with the emerging NATO command and control network that is under development. One benefit of the phased, adaptive approach is that there is a high degree of flexibility – in addition to sea-based assets, there are many potential locations for the architecture’s land-based elements, some of which will be re-locatable. We plan to deploy elements in northern and southern Europe and will be consulting closely at NATO with Allies on the specific deployment options.
We also welcome Russian cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests. We have repeatedly made clear to Russia that missile defense in Europe poses no threat to its strategic deterrent. Rather, the purpose is to strengthen defenses against the growing Iranian missile threat. There is no substitute for Iran complying with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. But ballistic missile defenses will address the threat from Iran’s ballistic missile programs, and diminish the coercive influence that Iran hopes to gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing capabilities.
Through the ongoing Department of Defense ballistic missile defense review, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to provide recommendations to the President that address other aspects of our ballistic missile defense capabilities and posture around the world.
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Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance