Confidence in the radar

If the moment ever comes when our national ballistic missile system is tested, not by our government, but by a foreign missile attacking the United States, our government is confident that we can track the missile.

There are many aspects to missile defense and when the moment of truth come, each must work perfectly in tandem with the others. And each must be of high enough quality that there are precise and accurate responses to the major variables.

The new sea-based, X-band radar is proving to be key to our success. The level of improvement it offers compared or systems in the past is overwhelming. It has singlehandedly increased our officials’ confidence in an intercept. If, as Lt. Gen. Trey Obering said, it can track a baseball from the Chesapeake Bay to San Francisco, it is not hard to argue that it is potentially the biggest upgrade that the GMD system will see in for five years. It is a leap. And its mobility could play a major role in the future, as it already did last weekend when it was in Hawaii.

Moscow’s Missile Gambit

As President Obama and Russian President Medvedev continue to discuss and study American missile defense systems in Europe, I thought it would be useful to revisit a Washington Post Op-ed from last year. The authors, former undersecretary of state Robert Joseph and former deputy national security adviser J.D. Crouch II,  argue that Moscow’s opposition to the “Third Site” (the 10 interceptors in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic) is baseless considering the site will have no effect on Russia’s overwhelming offensive capabilities. Instead of posing any technical threat to Russia, they believe Russian opposition to the site stems mainly from emotions surrounding their lost influence in their “near abroad.” As the authors put it, the presence of American systems in former Soviet Union territory would, “remind (Russia) of the painful loss of empire.”

The authors note that when Americans have offered to cooperate with their Russian counterparts the offers have been either “deflected or rejected.” For example, Russia offered to co-host the radar in Azerbaijan only if plans for European based interceptors were dropped. And despite hard evidence to the contrary, Russia has continually downplayed or denied Iranian ballistic missile capabilities in order to deny the missile defense system the legitimacy it deserves.

The authors argue that we need to push forward with the radar and interceptors in Europe even if it is without Russian support. They say that we should be “respectful and transparent about the need for our deployments” but that we should make it clear to Russia we plan to proceed with our defenses even if it is without Russian cooperation.  As the authors put it, “the United States must move forward, just as Russia does when its vital interests are at stake.” Even though this piece was written during the Bush Administration, the points still hold true and are incredibly timely.

Iran speeding up ballistic missile production?

According to some Israeli sources, Iran is speeding up its production of long-range ballistic missiles. The reports indicate that Iran is planning to build 1,000 long-range ballistic missiles and 500 mobile launchers within the next six years. This is a change from current Iranian ballistic missile production that centers around building the medium-range Shehab-6 ballistic missile.The shift in production is believed to be a result of the successful May 20^th launch of the solid-fuel Sajjil-2 missile that has a range of 1,200 miles. The upgrade to solid-fuel means that Iranian ballistic missiles will be able to be launched quicker and will be more reliable.

Seven Steps for Missile Defense Success

In a recent paper, missile defense expert Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation outlined the “Seven Steps” that he feels need to be taken to strengthen our nation’s missile defense.

Step #1: Try to restore overall funding to the missile defense program, including for additional interceptors in Alaska, California, and Europe. To be effective, missile defense must be properly funded. The Administration’s $1.62 billion reduction from FY 2009 for missile defense is unwarranted, given the recent missile launches by both Iran and North Korea.

Step #2: Retain the MKV program, which would develop smaller and lighter kill vehicles so that more than one can be mounted on a defense interceptor, allowing it to destroy both the warhead and the decoys.

Step #3: Preserve the ABL program, the primary system in development for gauging the potentially dramatic improvements in combat capabilities derived from perfecting directed energy weapons.

Step #4: Field a system to protect U.S. coastal areas from sea-launched shorter-range missiles. In the near term, lesser missile powers and possibly terrorist groups could attack U.S. terri­tory by launching a short-range Scud missile from a container ship off the coast. Congress should direct the Navy to take steps to counter this threat.

Step #5: Advance the Obama Administration’s proposal for strengthened sea-based missile defenses by moving funding and management authority for these systems from the Missile Defense Agency to the Navy. It has long been expected that mature mis­sile defense systems developed under MDA manage­ment would be transferred to the services to manage remaining development and procurement activities. The sea-based systems developed by the MDA have matured to the point that such a transfer is warranted.[4]

Step #6: Continue boost-phase missile defense programs by focusing on developing and fielding interceptors derived from modified air-to-air missiles. The Administration’s new emphasis on ascent-phase intercept capabilities has come largely at the expense of boost-phase systems, specifically with termination of the KEI program and curtailment of the ABL program, but there remain strong arguments for retaining boost-phase options.

Step #7: Refute the charge that space-based missile defense will “weaponize” space. Congressional supporters of missile defense need to force a debate on the charge that space-based ballistic missile defense interceptors would weaponize space. The fact is that space was weaponized when the first ballistic missile was deployed, because ballistic missiles travel through space on their way to their targets.